We provide evidence of "soft" information production in investment banking. Using 2191 municipal bond offerings from 1997-2001, we find that "local" investment banks have substantial comparative and absolute advantages over non-local counterparts -locals charge lower fees and sell bonds at lower yields. Local investment banks' strongest comparative advantage is at underwriting bonds with higher credit risk and those bonds not rated by rating agencies. Our interpretation is that high-risk bonds and non-rated bonds are more difficult to evaluate and market, and investment banks with a local presence are better able to assess "soft" information and place difficult bond issues.
Introduction
How do financial intermediaries gather and process information? This question is at the heart of the academic literature on why commercial banks are "special" (see Bhattacharya and Thakor [1993] for a review). As technology has advanced, commercial banks have come to rely more upon "hard" information-information that can be put on paper or stored electronically, and hence transferred to others-rather than "soft" information-information that is more subtle and arises through familiarity and relationship lending (Petersen and Rajan [2002] and Berger, et al. [2002] ). As a result, lending arrangements between commercial banks and borrowers have evolved from strict ex ante screening and costly ex post monitoring, to more frequent ex post monitoring and quick intervention (Petersen and Rajan [2002] ). Indeed, the physical distance between commercial banks and their borrowers increased steadily and dramatically from 1973 to 1993 and commercial banks and borrowers are communicating "less and less in person."
Like commercial banks, investment banks are also in the business of gathering and processing information. However, a critical difference between investment banks and commercial banks is that investment banks generally do not retain a direct financial exposure to the issuers they serve. Thus, due to the nature of underwriting services, investment banks have little or no reason or opportunity for ex post monitoring because they do not maintain a position in the securities they sell, and so must rely almost solely upon ex ante screening and evaluation.
Investors in new issues rely upon investment bank underwriters to evaluate and synthesize information in both its "soft" and "hard" forms and convey this information to the market. This paper examines the ability of investment banks to evaluate and exploit information in the municipal bond underwriting arena.
Municipal bond underwriting is a part of the investment banking business where personal relationships can be as important as ability.
1 Because the location of a municipal issuer is welldefined, whereas a corporate issuer might have numerous and geographically disperse offices or branches, municipal issuers provide a useful laboratory to study whether location of a financial intermediary matters.
Are local investment banks, i.e., those with an on-going presence in a particular state, "better" underwriters for local bond issues? Local underwriters may have better knowledge of soft information about the municipalities offering the bonds. Daily exposure to local news stories, first-hand knowledge of the local economy, and personal relationships with key people at the issuing body would all give local underwriters an advantage at evaluating soft information over underwriters without local connections. Similarly, local underwriters may have better knowledge of local investors who might be interested in buying the bonds. Personal knowledge of and relationships with local money managers, bankers, institutional investors could all assist local underwriters in placement of the securities. These comparative advantages over underwriters without a local presence would allow the local investment banks to be more competitive, and charge lower fees and get better prices (and hence better interest rates) on the bonds they sell, ceteris paribus.
Political connections can also be very valuable (see, e.g., Fisman [2001] ), and local underwriters could have political connections in the state that better enable them to win underwriting bids. If so, local investment banks would try to capture economic rents, thereby charging higher fees, ceteris paribus. Exploiting personal connections with governmental officials or existing relationships with issuing bodies could improve a local investment bank's probability of winning an offering and/or their ability to charge higher fees. This might be a result of blatant corruption, or could be as innocuous as states giving preference to underwriters with an "on-going commitment to the state."
Which effect is more important? That is, are local underwriters more capable and adept at assembling soft information? Or can local underwriters exploit their connections and geography to the detriment of municipal bond issuers? The answer could vary from state to state, and whether local underwriters are "better" is, ultimately, an empirical question. We address this question using a sample of 2191 municipal bond offerings from 41 states and the District of Columbia during the period 1997-2001. We find that local underwriters charge lower fees on average than their "non-local" counterparts and place municipal bonds at lower yields than their non-local counterparts. There is substantial variation state-by-state, though. For instance, local underwriters in Louisiana charge around 140 basis points less in gross spreads on average than non-local underwriters. In contrast, local underwriters in West Virginia charge around 160 basis points more on average. Similarly, local underwriters in Louisiana and Ohio sell bonds at yields about 200 basis points lower than non-locals, and in Washington and
Colorado locals sell bonds at yields about 100 basis points higher than non-locals.
The benefits of having a local underwriter are evident even after controlling for other factors. Both gross spreads and yields are statistically significantly lower for bonds underwritten by locals than non-locals. Interestingly, these benefits are most acute for very opaque issuers.
The data indicate that local investment banks have a strong comparative advantage at underwriting munis with higher credit risk. Higher credit risk bonds command higher investment bank fees-on average, about 5.7 to 6.8 basis points per incremental "notch" in credit rating. Local investment banks, though, charge about 3.5 to 4.9 basis points less in gross spreads per credit rating notch than non-local underwriters after controlling for other factors, which represents about two thirds of the effect that ratings have on gross spreads. In similar fashion, bonds that are not rated command higher fees as well (about 73 basis points, over half the average gross spread in our sample). It is not surprising that gross spreads are higher for these bonds-they are likely more difficult to place because they lack the external certification that a bond rating agency provides. Local investment banks are able to place these "difficult" bonds at significantly lower fees than their non-local counterparts. We interpret these results as suggesting that relatively high-risk offerings are more difficult to evaluate and market.
Investment banks with a local presence are better able to evaluate and/or market "difficult" bond issues than underwriters without a local presence.
This "local" effect has an even larger effect on the yields on the bonds. Local underwriters have a strong comparative advantage at placing difficult high credit risk and nonrated bonds. Though yields are related to ratings-yields on bonds in our sample increase an average of 10.5 to 14.4 basis points per rating notch-local investment banks get significantly better yields for high risk and non-rated issues. The presence of a local investment bank decreases the yield at issue by about 7.1 to 10.2 basis points per rating notch, which represents about 70% of the effect ratings have on yields. Similarly, while non-rated bonds have yields about 200 basis points higher than rated bonds, local investment banks are able to cut this "no rating penalty" by over one third, or 76 basis points. We find similar results when examining what municipal bond market participants refer to as the "all-in costs"-that is, the sum of the investment banking spread and yield. Local underwriters significantly lower all-in costs and significantly reduce the cost-increasing impact of high-risk ratings and non-rated bonds.
We interpret these results as suggesting that relatively high-risk offerings are more difficult to evaluate and market and investment banks with a local presence are better able to evaluate and/or market "difficult" bond issues than underwriters without a local presence. Our paper fits most closely with the literatures on the importance of commercial bank location (Almazan [2002] , Hauswald and Marquez [2002] ) and how commercial banks evaluate soft and hard information (Stein [2002] , Petersen and Rajan [2002] , Berger et al. [2002] ). Although commercial banks may be able to exploit proximity by charging higher rates to nearby borrowers (Degryse and Ongena [2002] ), we find precisely the opposite for investment banks. We attribute this to investment banks' inability to informationally capture and exploit client firms as commercial banks sometimes can through relationship banking (see Sharpe [1990] , Rajan [1992] , and Boot [2000] ). Thus, in contrast to Petersen and Rajan [2002] , our paper provides evidence that "distance matters" for financial intermediation and soft information production when ex post monitoring is not feasible.
This paper is among the first to examine investment banks' ability to evaluate soft information and to document that investment bank location matters. 2 On average, investment banks with operations in the same state as municipal bond issuers provide services at lower costs and sell bonds at lower yields, particularly for bond issues that are especially difficult to value and place with investors. This evidence indicates that local investment banks have an absolute advantage at providing underwriting services.
Our findings suggest that investment banking firms with active municipal bond underwriting departments should find it useful to open branch offices in several states to better evaluate local issuers. Many states, naturally, will agree with this because they want more companies and employers in their states, as well as because they want lower costs for their bond
2 Malloy [2002] shows that geographically proximate security analysts provide better earnings forecasts. Coval and Moskowitz [2001] show that local mutual fund managers earn abnormal returns investing on local stocks. Their findings are broadly consistent with those presented in this paper -that proximity enhances information production. Neither paper addresses the underwriting role of investment banks.
issues. Moreover, many states evaluate underwriters' "commitment to the state" when deciding among investment banks vying for deals, and so investment bankers should (and perhaps do) take this into account.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief description of municipal bonds, a generalization of the underwriting process and the selection of underwriters, and a discussion of "pay to play" practices in the municipal bond industry. Section 3 describes the data we employ. Section 4 follows, and presents our results, and the final section provides concluding remarks.
Municipal bonds and underwriting

A. Underwriting and the investment banking process
For a typical "firm commitment" security issuance, investment banks purchase directly from the issuer all the securities that are to be sold to investors. 3 The investment banks pay the issuer less than the price at which they sell the securities to the public. The difference between the price at which the securities are bought from the issuer and sold to the public is referred to as the gross spread. This gross spread must compensate for all the services the investment banking group provides. The gross spread is generally broken down into three components -the management fee, the selling concession, and the underwriting fee.
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The management fee is the compensation the lead underwriter(s), or bookrunners receive. 5 The selling concession is the amount per share received by investment bankers in the selling syndicate -the group of investment bankers assembled by the lead underwriter to market and sell securities to the public. 6 The underwriting fee is the amount per security paid to the investment banks in the underwriting syndicate; this is the compensation they receive for bearing the risk that the securities will not be sold. The selling syndicate's responsibility is to line up investors to buy the securities being offered in the firm commitment offering. The underwriting syndicate's responsibility is to take ownership of the securities from the issuer and hold those securities during the short time period prior to their being placed with the investors.
B. Municipal bonds
The municipal bond (muni) market is inherently different than other new issues markets.
Rather than a corporation issuing securities, a state or local government is, at least indirectly, the issuer. The bonds typically mature in one to forty years and fund public projects such as roads, hearing and reads aloud the deal terms submitted by each potential underwriter. Using this process, contracts are awarded on the basis of lowest bid received.
A governmental entity wishing to select an underwriter through negotiation first issues a Request for Proposals ("RFP") or similar solicitation. Potential underwriters submit written proposals that are "graded" by the staff of the governmental unit. There may be oral presentations and question and answer sessions after the grading or the government may award the contract on the basis of the proposals alone.
C. Pay to Play
Historically, municipal bond underwriters have been notorious for bid rigging, bribery, insider trading, and other illegal activities (Mitchell and Vogel [1993] ). Though recent regulatory scrutiny has effectively eradicated corruption in the industry, personal and financial relationships between bond underwriters and politicians were at one time a critical dimension of competition among rival investment banks. In order to get lucrative underwriting contracts, investment banks would routinely make substantial campaign and other political contributions to politicians who would allocate underwriting business for their municipality or state. This widespread practice became known as "pay-to-play," and these contributions became known as a normal cost of doing business in the municipal underwriting industry.
Intense scrutiny of the municipal bond market and pay-to-play practices began in 1993, shortly after Arthur Levitt became the SEC chairman. The SEC brought nineteen municipal securities enforcement cases in the three years immediately following Levitt's appointment.
Reform imminent, the municipal bond underwriting industry voluntarily agreed to eliminate the pay-to-play political contributions. The initial draft of the self-regulatory plan was written in 1993 under the direction of Frank Zarb, then chairman of Primerica, the parent company of Smith Barney Shearson, a major municipal bond underwriting firm at the time (Fuerbringer [1993] ). In April 1994, the SEC established a rule that investment houses making political contributions could not sell bonds from that city/state for two years (Bradsher [1994] ). 9 The SEC's rule had its intended effect. Pay-to-play is no longer prevalent, but nonetheless, municipal bond underwriting is still a relationship-intensive part of the investment banking business. To avoid confounding effects, we examine municipal bond issues that came to market subsequent to the pay-to-play era.
Data
We obtain information for taxable municipal bond offerings that postdate the pay-to-play era (specifically, we use the period 1997-2001) from Securities Data Company (SDC). Our initial sample contains 2,283 bonds which have data for both issue size and the gross spread paid to investment banks. While taxable munis are a small proportion of the total municipal issues market, they provide a more attractive laboratory than their non-taxable counterparts. First, relatively low disclosure requirements reduce data availability for non-taxable munis. Second, the ability of investment banks to place non-taxable munis would depend heavily upon state-bystate tax brackets and rates. Using taxable municipals circumvents both these problems.
Each of our bonds has a lead investment bank, or bookrunner, and many have an underwriting syndicate of other investment banks that help sell the bonds. For each investment bank in the sample, we hand collect information on company headquarters and the principal locations of business. We determine these locations primarily from official state websites listing 9 A suit was subsequently brought by William B. Blount, chairman of the Democratic Party in Alabama and municipal banker at Blount Parrish Roton (a Montgomery, Alabama investment bank) that the SEC's stifling of payto-play was a violation of first and tenth amendment rights (Wayne [1994] ). The suit was not successful (Gasparino [1998] Moody's ratings, and if neither is available we treat the bond as non-rated. Following Cantor and Packer (1997), we classify the agencies' ratings to a numeric scale, assigning a value of 1 to the highest rated bonds (Aaa or AAA), a value of 2 to the next-highest credit quality rating (Aa1 or AA+), and so on. Thus, higher numerical bond ratings can be interpreted as denoting higher credit risk.
Following Megginson and Weiss [1991] , we measure investment bank reputation as market share by year. Market share is calculated as the total gross proceeds of municipal bond offerings an investment bank manages in a year divided by the total gross proceeds of all municipal bond issuances in the year. Traditional measures of investment bank reputation may not be relevant in the municipal bond market. Issuers of municipal bonds (state and local governments) may base their decision of which investment banks to hire on factors such as a particular bank having an office and employing residents of the state, rather than the bank's ability to value, market, and place the bonds. In that case, the decision of which bank to hire may be independent of any reputation, ability, or market share the investment bank enjoys.
Results
A. Market Concentration
The market for underwriting municipal bonds is fragmented. Table 1 shows concentration measures for municipal bond underwriting, and for comparison, investment bank market share for other new issues markets -seasoned equity offerings, convertible bond issues, and initial public offerings. Market share among investment banks is substantially less concentrated in the municipal bond market. This is consistent with investment banks being unable to reap rents from reputation, and hence not attempting to build market share in the municipal bond market. The top 10 investment banks have only 73% market share for municipal bond offerings, whereas that concentration is 86%, 87%, and 98%, respectively for IPOs, SEOs, and convertible bonds (see Table 1 ). There are 189 unique bookrunners in our sample. There are 55 investment banks that are the lead manager for only one offering in our sample, and 75 that are lead manager for less than three. The most prominent investment banks by number of issues for which they are the lead manager are Goldman Sachs (116 offerings) and William R. Hough (105 offerings).
Goldman Sachs is a national "bulge bracket" investment bank that is routinely at the top of underwriting league tables (Johnson and Miller [1988] ). Hough specializes in fixed-income securities, including municipal bonds. They are headquartered in Florida and have major offices in Maryland, Texas, Arizona, South Carolina, and Ohio.
<Insert Table 1 here> Nevada again has the smallest percentage of local syndicate members at 32.2%.
B. Sample Characteristics
<Insert Table 2 here> The average percentage spread in our sample is 1.16%. This is substantially lower than the spreads for equity issuances, which are typically 7.00% for initial public offerings and around 5-6% for seasoned equity offerings. The highest average percent spread for a state is 2.46%
(West Virginia) and the lowest average percent spread is 0.55% (District of Columbia).
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For several observations, yield and/or bond rating data are unavailable. There are 1680 observations with yield data and 1724 observations with bond rating data. The average yield in our sample is 6.7%, and the average rating is 2.35, which corresponds to slightly better than Aa2 or AA rated bonds. Several issuing states have average ratings in our sample of 1.00, or AaaLouisiana, New Mexico, and Utah, as well as the District of Columbia. West Virginia has the worst average bond ratings in our sample-5.5, or, halfway between A1 and A2. Note that the average ratings presented in the tables are the ratings for the bonds that are issued, not the states' ratings. For instance, Table 2 reports that the average rating for bonds issued by municipalities in Louisiana is Aaa, but the state's credit rating is A2. 12 The ratings can be different because municipalities are issuing the bonds, not the state, and credit risk for the entities can be different.
Also, many bonds are insured; insured bonds have a rating that reflects their insurer's creditworthiness (generally AAA) rather than the municipality's creditworthiness. While most bonds in our sample are rated by one or more rating agencies, many are not. Approximately 79% of the bonds in our sample are rated. State-by-state variation is large-many states issue only rated bonds, but the proportion of non-rated bonds can range as high as 40% (Indiana and Iowa) to 70% (West Virginia).
C. Spreads and Differences for Local and Non-Local Underwriters
The average spread in our overall sample is 1.160%. Unlike equity markets, there appears to be no substantial clustering of spreads at any particular level (Chen and Ritter [2000] ).
Figure 1 is a scatterplot of gross spread and the natural logarithm of issue size in millions, and
shows the substantial variation in gross spreads and lack of substantial clustering at any particular spread. and non-local spreads on a state-by-state basis can be quite large, however. For those states with more than two non-local underwriters, the largest average non-local spreads occur in Kansas, Louisiana, and New Jersey (3.31%, 2.37%, and 2.30%, respectively), and the smallest average non-local spreads occur in Colorado and Connecticut (0.39% and 0.47%, respectively). For those states with more than two local underwriters, the largest average local spreads occur in Alaska, Kansas, and West Virginia (1.57%, 1.56%, and 2.77%, respectively), and the smallest average local spreads occur in Kentucky and Maine (0.79% and 0.73%, respectively).
<Insert Table 3 here> The overall mean yield on bonds in our sample that are underwritten by non-local bookrunners is 6.91%, whereas the overall mean yield for bonds underwritten by local bookrunners is 6.67%. The difference in means is statistically significantly different from zero (t = 2.81). The overall mean size of bonds underwritten by non-local bookrunners is $25.1 million, versus $32.5 million for bond underwritten by locals. The difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The average numerical bond rating is 2.61 for non-local bookrunners and 2.30 for locals. The difference of means is statistically different than zero (t = 2.29). Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for yield, spread, total cost (i.e., yield plus spreadsometimes referred to as the "all-in cost" by underwriters and local governments), and percentage locally underwritten for several categories: by rating, by proximity of underwriter, by year, and several sub-categories. Surprisingly, yield and spread are higher for AAA or Aaa rated bonds than bonds with worse ratings, underscoring the importance of controlling for various determinants of yields and spreads. Non-rated bonds have the highest costs (average 9.62% total cost) and a low proportion of local underwriters (78.5%). Most bonds (1442) are underwritten by locals and are rated.
D. Spreads and Yields by Categories
<Insert Table 4 here> of offer size, although the total dollar fees increase with offer size. Size is also related to bond rating -larger issues are associated with better ratings. This is consistent with issuers taking advantage of strong credit ratings to issue large bond issues, and less credit-worthy issuers being unable to issue larger bond offerings. Higher reputation underwriters tend to be used for larger issues, and larger issues tend to have longer maturities.
E. Correlations
<Insert Table 5 here> The percent gross spread is strongly related to the bond yield, bond rating, and bookrunner reputation (market share). Consistent with the findings of Jewell and Livingston
[1998], investment banks charge higher spreads to underwrite less credit-worthy bonds. Further, higher reputation investment banks tend to underwrite safer bonds. Interestingly, higher reputation investment banks charge lower spreads (on average) than their lower reputation counterparts. This is consistent with a fragmented market where firms are unable to earn rents through reputation building.
Where there are local bookrunners, the composition of the entire underwriting syndicate tends to be local as well; the correlation between the Local dummy variable for a local bookrunner and the In-state variable, which denotes the percentage of the underwriting syndicate that is local, is over 90%. All the regressions described below were also done with the In-state variable replacing Local. As one might expect, all the results were qualitatively quite similar, and so are not reported.
F. The Effect of Local Investment Banks on Gross Spreads, Yields and Total Costs
We hypothesize that local investment banks have an advantage over non-local investment banks at providing underwriting services. Because gross spread is related to several characteristics of the bonds and the underwriters as described above, it is important to control for these in order to test our hypothesis. To test our hypothesis, we regress gross spread on variables to capture the effects of local underwriters and on control variables. Table 6 presents our regression results.
<Insert Table 6 here> We regress gross spread and yield to maturity on several independent variables. In all our regressions, the percentage of variation that is explained by our model is 34 to 40%. Our first two regression models regress gross spread on Ln(Size), underwriter reputation as proxied by a log transformation of investment bank market share, Bond Rating, a dummy variable for Nonrated bonds, years to maturity, the local bookrunner dummy, dummy variables for each year in the sample (omitting 2001), and a constant term. In the second regression we also include dummy variables for each state that has at least five local underwriters and at least five non-local underwriters. Because many states have only one non-local underwriter (and one state, Rhode
Island, has none), including dummy variables for these states would be capturing not only any state-specific effects, but also the effects of local underwriters in general. Requiring both several local and non-local underwriters mitigates this problem. Twenty-four states in our sample meet this requirement.
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As expected, percent spreads decline with the size of the bond issue, reflecting economies of scale to larger bond issues. Investment bank market share is also negatively related to gross spreads. Bonds with higher numerical ratings-that is, with more credit risk-and bonds that are not rated are associated with higher spreads. For each incremental rating notch, gross spreads increase by 2.70 to 2.85 basis points. The absence of a rating increases fees about 53 basis points. These findings are consistent with underwriters having more difficulty placing higher risk bonds, and requiring more compensation for the additional work. The presence of a local underwriter, after controlling for other determinants of fees, statistically significantly decreases gross spreads, which we interpret as evidence of an advantage that local bookrunners enjoy over 13 Results are qualitatively similar when we use less restrictive screens for state-specific dummies.
non-locals. This advantage may manifest itself as having better networks of potential investors, or as a superior ability to evaluate municipal bond offerings and certify them to investors.
The second two regression models in Table 6 regress yield to maturity on the same variables-Ln(Size), underwriter reputation as proxied by a log transformation of investment bank market share, Bond Rating, a dummy variable for Non-rated bonds, years to maturity, the local bookrunner dummy, dummy variables for each year in the sample (omitting 2001), and a constant term. In the second of these two regressions we also include state-specific dummy variables as described above. Results indicate that yields decline with the size of the bond issue, and that investment bank market share is unrelated to yields. Bonds with higher numerical ratings-that is, with more credit risk-and bonds that are not rated are associated with significantly higher yields. For each incremental rating notch, yields increase by 4.5 to 6 basis points. The absence of a rating increases yields by 139 to 145 basis points. These findings are consistent with investors requiring a premium to hold higher risk bonds and bonds without a rating. The presence of a local underwriter, after controlling for other determinants of yields, statistically significantly decreases yields.
The last two regression models use total costs (that is, the sum of the investment banking spread and the yield to maturity on the bonds) as the dependent variable. Consistent with the regressions that use spreads and yields individually as dependent variables, these results indicate that total costs decline with the size of the bond issue, that bonds with more credit risk and bonds that are not rated are associated with significantly higher yields. For each incremental rating notch, total costs increase by 7.8 to 9.5 basis points. The absence of a rating increases total costs by 210 to 217 basis points. The presence of a local underwriter, after controlling for other determinants of costs, statistically significantly decreases total costs by 27 to 30 basis points.
We interpret this as further evidence of the advantage that local investment banks have over nonlocals.
G. The Marginal Effect of Local Underwriters on Gross Spreads
This section and the next contain our main results. In the regressions described above, we use a dummy variable for bonds underwritten by local investment banks to capture the impact that investment bank "locality" has on fees and yields. Those regressions indicate that local investment banks have an absolute advantage over non-local counterparts. For which bonds is this advantage the strongest? It is this question that this section and the next two shed light upon.
In Table 7 , we revisit the regressions described above, but add two additional variables.
We regress gross spreads on the log of issue size, investment bank market share, numerical bond rating (as described above), a dummy variable for non-rated bonds, the years to the bond's maturity, a local bookrunner dummy, and controls for each year and state-specific dummies. We add two variables to this model specification-variables that capture the interaction between local investment banks and bond rating, and the interaction between local investment banks and non-rated bonds. By controlling for the total effect that local investment banks have (through the Local dummy), the interpretation of the coefficients on the interaction terms are the marginal effects of a local bookrunner.
<Insert Table 7 here> The results indicate that local investment banks have the strongest advantage at underwriting extremely difficult to place and informationally opaque bonds. Though higher credit risk bonds are associated with higher investment bank fees, this credit risk "penalty" is much lower for bonds underwritten by local investment banks. While on average fees increase about 5.7 to 6.8 basis points per incremental "notch" in credit rating, local investment banks charge about 3.5 to 4.9 basis points less in gross spreads per credit rating notch than non-local underwriters. This difference represents approximately two thirds of the incremental effect that ratings have on gross spreads and is statistically significant.
Similarly, bonds that are not rated also have higher fees. Non-rated bonds have fees more than 70 basis points higher, on average, than rated bonds. Again, local investment banks impose a much smaller "penalty" for underwriting non-rated bonds-about one third less than their non-local counterparts. This difference is statistically significant.
Note that when including the two interaction terms, Local X Rating and Local X NonRated, the coefficient on the Local dummy becomes weakly positive. This is because the strongest effect that local investment banks have on lowering fees (holding other things constant)
is in the non-rated bonds and high credit risk bonds. Thus, it is the interaction terms that absorb the fee-reducing impact of local investment banks and it is the relatively high-risk municipal Thus, the net effect of a local bookrunner on fees for the most informationally transparent bond is weakly positive. Though the magnitude is positive, we cannot reject that the sum of the coefficients is different from zero for any of the regression specifications (test statistics not reported). Overall, our interpretation of the regression results presented in Table 7 is that local investment banks are better able than non-local counterparts to evaluate and market the bond issues that are otherwise difficult to place.
H. The Marginal Effect of Local Underwriters on Yields
This "local" effect has an even larger effect on the yields on the bonds. In Table 8 , we parallel the regressions described in the previous section, but the dependent variable is the yield on the bonds. Thus, we regress yields on the log of issue size, investment bank market share, numerical bond rating (as described above), a dummy variable for non-rated bonds, the years to the bond's maturity, a local bookrunner dummy, and controls for each year and state-specific dummies. As above, we include the two interaction terms, Local X Rating and Local X NonRated, so that we can determine the marginal effects of a local bookrunner.
<Insert Table 8 here>
As in the Table 7 regressions, when we include the two interaction terms the coefficient on the Local dummy becomes weakly positive. 14 The strongest effect that local investment banks have on lowering yields (holding other things constant) is in the non-rated bonds and high credit risk bonds. We find that though yields increase, on average, 10.5 to 14.4 basis points per credit rating notch, local investment banks get significantly better yields for high risk bonds.
Local bookrunners, as opposed to non-locals, decrease the yield at issue by about 7.1 to 10.2 basis points per rating notch. This represents about 70% of the effect ratings have on yields.
Non-rated bonds have yields about 200 basis points higher than rated bonds. Local investment banks, though, are able to reduce this "no rating penalty" by about 76 basis points, or approximately one third. As with the regressions where we investigate the determinants of gross 14 The interpretation of this result is the same as the interpretation of the analogous result described in the previous section. The net effect of a local bookrunner on yields-that is, the sum of the coefficients on Local and Local X Rated--is about a 9 basis point increase. However, we cannot reject that this increase is statistically different from zero for any of the regression models (test statistics not reported).
spreads, we interpret these results as suggesting that local investment banks are better able to evaluate and/or market difficult bond issues, and this manifests itself in lower yields for the issuer.
I. The Marginal Effect of Local Underwriters on Total Costs
The "local" effect on total costs is even sharper than that on yields and spreads separately. In Table 9 , we regress total costs on the same independent variables as in the previous two tables. As above, we include the two interaction terms, Local X Rating and Local X Non-Rated, so that we can determine the marginal effects of a local bookrunner.
<Insert Table 9 here>
Local investment banks have a strong impact on lowering total costs (holding other things constant) for non-rated bonds and high credit risk bonds. We find that though total costs increase about 20 basis points per credit rating notch on average, local investment banks significantly reduce total costs for high risk bonds. Local bookrunners, as opposed to non-locals, decrease the total cost by about 13.7 to 16.3 basis points per rating notch. This represents about 70% of the effect ratings have on total costs.
Non-rated bonds have total costs about 300 basis points higher than rated bonds. Local investment banks reduce this "no rating penalty" by about 105 basis points, or approximately one third. We interpret these results as suggesting that local investment banks are better able to evaluate and/or market difficult bond issues, and this manifests itself in lower costs for the issuer.
Conclusion
The impact that local investment banks have on municipal bond costs is non-trivial.
Despite the bad reputation municipal bond underwriters earned in the pay-to-play era, we find that investment banks with local connections have substantial comparative and absolute advantages over non-local counterparts. Using 2191 municipal bond offerings from 1997-2001, we find that investment banks with an in-state presence charge lower fees and sell bonds at lower yields than non-local underwriters. This local advantage is especially strong for the underwriting of high-risk and non-rated municipal bonds. One interpretation of these results is that risky and non-rated bonds are more difficult to evaluate and market, and investment banks with a local presence are better able to assess soft information and can better handle "difficult" bond issues than non-local counterparts.
An implication of our findings is that municipal bond underwriting investment banks might find it useful to open branch offices in several states to better evaluate local issuers and to establish long-term connections with local banks, insurance companies, and others who are regular purchasers of municipal bonds. Indeed, this is consistent with our finding that over 80% of municipal bonds are underwritten by an investment bank with a local office. Furthermore, because many states evaluate underwriters' commitment to the state when selecting among investment banks vying for deals, a local presence might further benefit investment bankers looking for deal flow.
Our paper also provides indirect evidence on the distinctiveness of relationship lending by commercial banks. Other researchers have shown that commercial banks are able to exploit informationally captured borrowers by charging higher rates. In contrast, we find that local investment banks charge lower fees and sell bonds at lower yields than non-local counterparts. 
Table 7 -Marginal Effects of Local Underwriters on Gross Spreads
Data are for the sample of 2162 municipal bond issues with data availability. The dependent variable is the percent gross spread. Ln(Size) denotes the natural logarithm of the proceeds of the bond issue. Non-rated is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bond is not rated and zero otherwise. The variable denoted Bond Rating reflects a bond rating agency's credit assessment -a numerical score of 1 denotes a AAA rating, 2 denotes a AA+ or Aa1 rating, etc., and a value of zero if the bond is not rated. Note that assigning non-rated bonds a value of zero is arbitrary, and any value other than numerical ratings assigned to our bonds would produce identical results. Maturity reflects the life of a bond in years. Ln(Market Share) is the natural log of ((market share * 10) + 1), where market share is the percent proportion of all proceeds a bookrunner managed in a year. Local denotes a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the lead manager is "local" (i.e., has an office in that state) and zero otherwise. Data are for the sample of 1676 municipal bond issues with data availability. The dependent variable is the percent yield to maturity for the bonds. Ln(Size) denotes the natural logarithm of the proceeds of the bond issue. Non-rated is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bond is not rated and zero otherwise. The variable denoted Bond Rating reflects a bond rating agency's credit assessment -a numerical score of 1 denotes a AAA rating, 2 denotes a AA+ or Aa1 rating, etc., and a value of zero if the bond is not rated. Note that assigning non-rated bonds a value of zero is arbitrary, and any value other than numerical ratings assigned to our bonds would produce identical results. Maturity reflects the life of a bond in years. Ln(Market Share) is the natural log of ((market share * 10) + 1), where market share is the percent proportion of all proceeds a bookrunner managed in a year. Local denotes a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the lead manager is "local" (i.e., has an office in that state) and zero otherwise. Yield is the yield to maturity on the bonds. Robust standard errors (see White 1980) are used to calculate p-values, which appear which appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. Data are for the sample of 1676 municipal bond issues with data availability. The dependent variable is Total Cost, the sum of the percent gross spread and the percent yield to maturity. Ln(Size) denotes the natural logarithm of the proceeds of the bond issue. Non-rated is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if the bond is not rated and zero otherwise. The variable denoted Bond Rating reflects a bond rating agency's credit assessment -a numerical score of 1 denotes a AAA rating, 2 denotes a AA+ or Aa1 rating, etc., and a value of zero if the bond is not rated. Note that assigning non-rated bonds a value of zero is arbitrary, and any value other than numerical ratings assigned to our bonds would produce identical results. Maturity reflects the life of a bond in years. Ln(Market Share) is the natural log of ((market share * 10) + 1), where market share is the percent proportion of all proceeds a bookrunner managed in a year. Local denotes a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the lead manager is "local" (i.e., has an office in that state) and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors (see White 1980) are used to calculate p-values, which appear in parentheses below the coefficient estimates. 
